A Radar composite
showing enemy locations
at Site 85 as of 9 March
1968.
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site
85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force,
they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General
Vang Pao's 700
troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support
in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's
progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this
disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they
waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85.
This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After
seeing the radar image above, how could there have been any doubt that it
was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently
did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2)
wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site. Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned
and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968,
the inevitable happened... three teams of PAVN commandos... under cover of darkness,
scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in
through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned
it.) Against previously agreed upon terms,
Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored
and Betrayed", Chapter
6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the
Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the
trained PAVN commandos.
Attack route presumed
used by
the PAVN commandos on March 11, 1968. Route provided by Col Jerry Clayton on
the NBC documentary "Mystery on The
Mountain" Col Clayton, the
commander of Site 85,
was not on the
mountain
at the time it was overrun.
Why wasn't Col. Clayton at the site during
this critical period? Here are Col. Clayton's own words.
"It was not 'by chance' that I was
not there that night. At the request of the ambassador in Laos (for all intents
and purposes, my boss) I had requested another crew be dispatched from the US so
we could continue the around the clock operation he wanted. Bill (Lt/Col
Blanton) and I agreed
that he would take an extra crew up there right away and I would relieve him with
the new crew in 8 days. There was no other way to do it."
On March 11, 1968
the following Telegram from
the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State was sent.
341. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, March 11, 1968, 0532Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, 7th AF, and 7/13 AF.
5038. 1. As Dept has probably learned from military sources, enemy has
effectively eliminated air navigation facilities at Site 85. Action began
yesterday evening with artillery and mortar shelling. Decision to destroy
facilities by self-destruction was taken in small hours of morning. Helicopter
evacuation was arranged for first light this morning.
2. Evacuation plans have been seriously disrupted by enemy activity and
several [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel have
apparently been dispersed from pre-planned evacuation sites. Although seven of
them have been accounted for as of this time, eleven are yet to be located. Of
those seven accounted for, three are dead on the site, one died in the
helicopter en route and three are at Udorn.
3. In addition to these personnel, two CAS and one AIRA forward air
controller have been withdrawn from their evacuation sites. Other local
personnel (wounded, etc.) have also been extracted.
4. Fighting and shelling continues, as well as helicopter and ground
evacuation efforts. Because of confused situation at site and withdrawal our CAS
personnel (one of whom was wounded) it will doubtless be some time before we
have clear picture or further significant reports.
5. We will, of course, continue reports as information comes in. At first
glance, however, it appears we may have pushed our luck one day too long in
attempting to keep this facility in operation.
Sullivan
The next telegram from Ambassador Sullivan to the State Department on
March
13, 1968, indicates the destructive end of Lima Site 85. It also drastically
reduced the chances of recovering any remains of KIA's. The poor
evacuation results were blamed upon the USAF personnel. All indicators
pointed toward destruction of sensitive equipment, and an evacuation, on
the morning of March 10, 1968. The
military and political situation could have been dramatically reduced if this
had occurred.
342. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/
Vientiane, March 13, 1968, 0558Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, COMUSMACV, 7AF, and 7/13 AF.
5073. Ref: Vientiane 5038./2/
/2/Document 341.
1. Evacuation operations at Site 85 have been completed and site is currently
in enemy hands. Personnel from mountain-top positions have been extracted by
helicopter with exception relatively small group SGU local troops who have
descended to base camp positions, joined other units there, and are withdrawing
overland to previously agreed safe havens. Since we may assume that these safe
havens will also come under enemy pressure soon, there may be required a second
phase of withdrawals for these latter personnel.
2. Final count on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
personnel accounts for all but three. One of these may subsequently be listed as
dead if and when we can get more coherent information from survivors, some of
whom in state of considerable shock./3/
/3/In telegram 5103 from Vientiane, March 12, Sullivan reported that there
would be a search and rescue operation for personnel still unaccounted for, the
remaining structures at Site 85 would be destroyed by napalm bombs dropped from
U.S. aircraft, no publicity would be given to the battle, Souvanna would be
informed, and the next of kin would be notified in the United States. (Ibid.) In
telegrams 5119 from Vientiane, March 13, Sullivan reported that he informed
Souvanna of the capture of Site 85. Sullivan also reported that 11 U.S.
personnel were killed; the 3 previously unaccounted for were killed according to
the survivors. (Ibid.)
3. Contrary to figures cited reftel, there was total of 16 of these personnel
at communications site, rather than 18 as we had earlier understood. Of these
16, five were extracted alive but one was killed in helicopter when he was hit
by ground fire. Eight others are known dead. Three are unaccounted for, although
one of these, as stated above, may be presumed dead.
4. Confusion
surrounding extraction these personnel stems from two factors not yet fully
explained. First was fact that these personnel, instead of assembling at
pre-arranged evacuation site, decide to climb down over face of sheer cliffs to
a narrow ledge, using some sort of cargo harness system which they devised for
this purpose. It is not known why or when they decided to take this action. But
it is presumed that they must have thought, contrary to fact, that trail to
evacuation site was blocked.(See comments below from Lt/Col Douglas Farnsworth)
5. Second was fact that small enemy "suicide squad", which seems to
have made improbable ascent up these same cliffs, surprised and caught these [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel on their narrow
ledge, gunning and grenading them while they were trapped in this inescapable
position. It was here that these men suffered such heavy casualties and where
most of them are reported to have died. Three bodies were subsequently seen on
this ledge, but remainder are assumed to have fallen off sheer 2000 foot drop. (See
comments below from Lt/Col Douglas Farnsworth)
6. We and Air Force personnel at Udorn will attempt reconstruct story further
from survivors when latter have recovered from sedation and shock. Conclusion,
however, seems quite definitive that none of missing personnel are likely to be
alive.
7. For this reason, USAF late yesterday afternoon flew several missions
against remains of navigation and communications equipment on mountain top, as
well as abandoned artillery position, in order destroy materiel left behind.
Photo missions are being run today to determine whether further strikes are
necessary.
8. Several follow-up actions remain to be accomplished, and will be subject
of meeting this afternoon between Ambassador and DEPCOM 7/13 AF.
A. We must discuss with RLG and determine what, if anything, needs to be said
about this action. It remains to be seen whether Hanoi or Pathet Lao radios will
announce their victory.
B. We must decide how to handle next of kin notification, casualty
announcements, etc.
C. We must expedite action for replacement site, at least for TACAN.
D. We should discuss possibility that Site 36 will be next on enemy list and
what contingencies we should consider there.
Sullivan
From Lt/Col Douglas
Farnsworth, Commander of the TSQ-81 Installation team at Site 85.
"In December or possibly late November 1967 I was passing
through Bangkok and ran into Lt/Col Bill Blanton. We talked at
length, six to eight hours. The main thrust of our conversation was
site defense. I told him that I thought the defense posture was
unsatisfactory as the site could be destroyed by infiltration, a small
team, two or three men. To the best of my knowledge, there had never
been any Site 85 plans developed to guard against such an attack. In fact,
I thought a full scale attack would not be necessary. With an
infiltration attack by sappers there would be no warning and thus no
chance for escape or rescue. I told Blanton that I thought the
attack would come at night against the main radar van with collateral fire
on the men in the living quarters. I emphasized the fact that during
the construction phase we were continually visited by indigenous personnel
among whom there must have been numerous unfriendlies. There was no
way we could keep everyone off the construction site much less the
mountain. It is my firm belief that the full scale assault launched
against the site was for political and propaganda reasons as well as site
elimination.
I advised Bill to brief the men on an
alternate pickup site in the area of the range marker. And to
practice how to get there, individually and in the dark. However,
this would be a long shot as I didn't think many men would survive a
sapper attack.
We also discussed the ridge line. I
told Blanton I had walked the ridge line for a short distance and thought
it passable. I also told him I had forwarded my findings to 7/13 AF
but never received any acknowledgement. I did not follow the ridge
line to its end since it was one of those risky trails which are easier to
climb than to descend. I felt that in following the ridge line too
far I might get into a position which would require calling for outside
help. This I did not want to risk for obvious reasons. I might
add, I also investigated the ridges on the other side of the site and
found a line which might have been useful. Again, I did not
investigate it fully for obvious reasons. Blanton and I discussed
hanging ropes over the side of the cliff as an escape possibility.
However, we ruled this out since it would have revealed the escapees
location."
{Source: ltr Lt/Col
Farnsworth to Dr. Timothy Castle 28 August 2000}
Recce Photo taken 16
March 1968
Photo courtesy of Ken Molly Lt. Col. USAF (Ret)
RF4c Commander: Lt. Col.
Alexander (Al) Milligan IV
RF4c WSO: Lt. Col. Ken Molly
Picture taken on Ken's 30th
Birthday. By coincidence, Al and Ken were both from Pittsburgh, PA,
both were stationed
together at RAF Alconbury and Udorn RTAFB. Ken retired. Al later
made Full Col. and was assigned to Peterson Field, CO. Al was on an
inspection team visiting AF bases in Turkey in 1982 when the C-130 they
were on crashed, killing everyone on board
A flight of F-4's from the 555th
TFS were sent to destroy the Radar equipment and other facilities, they
were not effective. Finally, Bill Palank and
his team of A-1E Skyraiders accomplished the objective.
This does not end the story of Phou Pha Thi (Lima Site 85). There
are on going efforts to account for the KIA/BNR, POW/MIA's. Ann Holland, wife
of TSgt Melvin Holland, is continuing to dig deeper into documents, interviews and
wherever else she can find any information. On June 19, 1996 Ann Holland
testified before Congress. HERE is her
testimony. Several documentaries are being developed to be aired late 1999
or early 2000. This is also grist for Hollywood.
The
eleven missing men - KIA/BNR or POW/MIA - Damn it we just don't know! We miss them, we pray for them! May God's hand be upon them
wherever they are.
LtCol. Clarence Finlay Blanton
MSGT. James Henry Calfee
SSGT. James Woodrow Davis
SSGT. Henry Gerald Gish
TSGT Willis Rozelle Hall
TSGT Melvin Arnold Holland
TSGT Herbert Arthur Kirk
SGT David Stanley Price
TSGT Patrick Lee Shannon
TSGT Donald Kenneth Springsteadah
SSGT Don Franklin Worley
Image courtesy of Keith Hammerbeck
The twelfth missing man
is Capt. Donald Elliot Westbrook
whose A1E aircraft was shot down while searching for survivors.
CMSgt Richard L.
Etchberger received the Air Force Cross
posthumously. click here to read his Citation.
There were 20 Air Force Cross's awarded to
enlisted personnel during the Vietnam War
Click for pictures of Building and Museum dedications to CMSGT
Richard L. Etchberger:
